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Abstract
In 1946, Bernard Baruch, the American representative to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, introduced the United
States’ proposal for international control of atomic energy, known as the Baruch Plan. It suggested a regime under which the
United Nations would enforce an international ban on atomic weapons. The proposal, which stated that the United States would
destroy its atomic arsenal only once the plan were fully implemented, was blocked in the United Nations by the Soviet Union. This
paper argues that domestic public opinion played a significant role in the development, negotiation, and failure of the plan, but that
the sentiments of the public were partly shaped by Baruch at the same time. Public opinion affected the formulation of the
proposal, which Baruch based in part on what he believed the American populace favored. By helping discourage negotiations,
public opinion also indirectly contributed to the eventual failure of the plan.

On June 14, 1946, Bernard Baruch, the

fear. Let us not deceive ourselves; we must elect world

American representative to the United Nations Atomic

peace or world destruction.”iii Following this dramatic

Energy Commission, presented the United States’ plan

opening, Baruch introduced his proposal, which

for international control of atomic technology at the

recommended the creation of an Atomic Development

commission’s inaugural meeting.i With World War II

Authority to oversee the use of atomic energy and to

having ended less than a year prior, the United States

inspect atomic facilities to ensure they were used

and the Soviet Union were drifting into a period of

solely for peaceful purposes. He based his plan on the

geopolitical tension that would soon become known as

recommendations of the Acheson-Lilienthal Report,

the Cold War. At the time, the United States had a

issued in March 1946 by a State Department advisory

monopoly over atomic weapons; the Soviet Union

committee headed by Dean Acheson, Under Secretary

would not test its first until 1949.ii

of State, and David Lilienthal, Chairman of the

Baruch prefaced his speech with a somber

Tennessee Valley Authority. However, Baruch’s

warning of the importance of the moment: “Behind the

proposal differed from that report in that he charged

black portent of the new atomic age lies a hope which,

the United Nations Security Council with enforcing the

seized upon with faith, can work our salvation. If we

plan by using sanctions to punish nations that violated

fail, then we have damned every man to be the slave of

it. Controversially, he proposed that in regards to
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atomic matters, all members of the Security Council

World War II, it was evident that the American public

should forfeit their veto power. Additionally, Baruch

wished that their government continue to maintain

declared that only once the plan were fully

exclusive control over atomic secrets and the bombs

implemented would the United States destroy its

they bore. In a September 1945 poll conducted by the

atomic arsenal. Because the Soviet Union strongly

National Opinion Research Center (NORC), 85% of

opposed both of these requirements and the plan’s

respondents stated that they wanted the United States

passage required unanimous approval in the Security

government to keep secret the information that led to

Council, disagreement on these two provisions was the

the development of atomic weapons.v In the same poll,

proximate cause of the failure of the proposal, which

respondents were asked what country they thought was

came to be known as the Baruch Plan.iv

most likely to attack the United States with an atomic

Public interest in, and media coverage of, the

weapon in the future. A plurality, 36%, believed the

plan was widespread given the exceptionally high

Soviet Union posed the greatest threat, followed by

stakes involved. Combined with the importance that

Japan at 25% and Germany at 16%.vi Despite the war

Baruch himself placed on the attitudes of the American

having ended just weeks earlier, Americans were

people, this led public opinion to play a significant part

already more suspicious of their erstwhile ally than of

in the rise and fall of the plan. This paper examines the

their recently-defeated enemies.

extent of that role. Because Baruch formulated the

But by the beginning of 1946, Americans’

contents of the plan in part based on his perception of

views on international atomic control seemed to have

the populace’s beliefs, public opinion helped shape the

tempered somewhat. Public attitudes softened as the

development of the plan. Public sentiments also

extreme vigilance that accompanied the war receded

reinforced Baruch’s confidence in the proposal and

and post-war demobilization took effect. In a poll

contributed to his intransigent refusal to alter its

conducted by NORC in March 1946, 72% said they

elements. Consequently, public opinion was partly

would support action by the United Nations prohibiting

responsible for the ultimate fate of the plan because it

production of atomic bombs anywhere in the world if

encouraged Baruch to rule out the possibility of

the United Nations were given the power to enforce

negotiations. Public opinion thus played a considerable

this ban. Of this 72%, 78% were in favor of the ban

role in the development of the Baruch Plan, helped

even if it would require the destruction of all extant

engender a dearth of negotiation, and indirectly

atomic bombs.vii Americans seemed not to be bent on

contributed to the failure of the proposal.

ensuring that their nation maintained its atomic

Domestic public sentiments guided the
development of the plan. In the immediate aftermath of
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enforceable. However, the observation that Americans’

Nations. When asked in a September 1946 NORC poll

attitudes towards international atomic control had

whether the United States should “try to keep ahead of

softened must be qualified with the fact that at the

other countries by making more and better atomic

same time, an April 1946 poll by the American

bombs” or “make the United Nations organization

Institute of Public Opinion (AIPO) demonstrated that a

strong enough to prevent all countries, including the

majority, 61%, still wanted the United States to

United States, from making atomic bombs,” two-thirds

continue manufacturing atomic bombs.viii This series of

of respondents chose the latter option.x

polls indicated that most Americans favored strong
enforcement mechanisms, were suspicious of the

Baruch was acutely aware of public opinion
and considered winning over the public to be important

Soviet Union, and wanted
the United States to
maintain, or even expand, its
atomic arsenal in the
meantime while an
international plan for atomic
control was still developing.
These views
persisted over the course of
the year. A November 1946
AIPO poll indicated
continued opposition to

for securing an enforceable

“This series of polls
indicated that most
Americans favored strong
enforcement mechanisms,
were suspicious of the
Soviet Union, and wanted
the United States to
maintain, or even expand,
its atomic arsenal…”

agreement on international atomic
control. In a speech he gave to a
meeting of the United Jewish
Appeal in February 1946, four
months before presenting the plan,
he stated, “Public opinion cannot
be bought, but it can be deserved.
A people who are eyed
suspiciously must live so as to be
the more deserving – not by
cringing; not by handwashing; not

unilateral cessation of production and destruction of

by appeasement, for these have always failed, but by

existing atomic weapons. Distrust of the Soviet Union

keeping our heads up and our shoulders back, ready to

seemed to lie at the heart of these beliefs; 72% of

help and to lead in those causes that build mankind.”

respondents stated that they did not believe that, were

He also urged that American military dominance and

the United States to unilaterally disarm, the Soviets

international leadership were key to maintaining world

would then agree to allow a United Nations committee

peace: “Don’t let us be the first to disarm! … Don’t let

to verify that they were not producing atomic weapons

us dodge the duty which lies upon us of helping to

either.ix But despite being opposed to unilateral

keep the world’s peace. We must be strong!”xi

disarmament, Americans still seemed open to the
notion of an international ban enforced by the United

Baruch’s speech suggests that he was keenly
attuned to public sentiments. Furthermore, his criticism
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of unilateral disarmament and appeasement, though not

truth to the public would be a gigantic error. … That

unique in the post-war period, foreshadowed later

policy is to set a goal for which we should strive.”

statements in which he denounced proposed

Hinting at the United States’ impending loss of its

modifications of his plan as appeasement of the

atomic monopoly and underscoring the urgency of

Soviets that would be received negatively by the

enacting an effectual plan, Baruch warned that “our

American people. Baruch delivered this address in

secrets are not as secret as we think they are.” He

front of supporters of the United Jewish Appeal, a

emphasized that above all the proposal must include

Jewish philanthropic group that raised funds to support

the possibility of enforcement, ranging from an initial

Jews in Europe and Palestine. He shrewdly connected

punishment, sanctions, to the ultimate penalty, war:

past appeasement of Nazi Germany to possible future

“[Here] lies the essential difference between the

appeasement of the Soviet Union, thereby constructing

Acheson-Lilienthal Report and my own position.”

an analogy that he used to paint a negative picture of

Whereas the former constituted a mere “basis of

the Soviet Union in the minds of the American Jews he

negotiations,” the latter provided “a formula of a

addressed.

secure peace.”

In the months following this speech, Baruch

Baruch’s memo also emphasized the

carefully crafted the contents of his proposal, in part

importance of “bringing to the attention of the

based on what he believed the American public would

American people … the necessity of adding

consider conducive to international security. He

enforcement,” suggesting that he favored a two-way

described his thinking in a memo to President Truman

relationship between himself and public opinion.xii He

on June 6, 1946, eight days before he presented the

expressed that while the contents of the proposal

plan at the United Nations. Given the intended

should fit the wishes of the public, the former should

audience of the document, it serves as an especially

also suggest to the latter what to prioritize.

revealing source indicating Baruch’s views on the role

Furthermore, archival evidence indicates it is

of public opinion. Unlike in a speech, in this classified

possible that Baruch utilized his connections in the

communication Baruch did not intend to impress a

news media to obtain favorable coverage. In an

broader audience; rather, he directly addressed the

October 1948 telegram to Under Secretary of State

President (with an expectation of privacy) in hopes of

Robert Lovett, Baruch discussed his secret

convincing Truman of the need to provide the

collaboration with editors. The message concerned the

populace with a practical proposal. Baruch wrote he

American press’s response to comments that the Soviet

was “deeply convinced” that “any expression which

permanent representative to the United Nations, Andrei

falls short of bringing a sense of security and a sense of

Vishinsky, made during continuing United Nations
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debate over international control of atomic energy.

disseminated well after his plan had already failed, it

Vishinsky pushed for immediate American atomic

also suggests the possibility that he may have done so

disarmament and argued that the United States’ refusal

during the time when it was still a live proposal.

to cease production of atomic bombs indicated it was

Although it was probable that the editors involved

preparing for a war against the Soviet Union. Baruch’s

truthfully expressed their beliefs, clearly they were not

telegram read in part,

neutral observers; rather, they consciously attempted to

As to stimulating sentiment on the soundness of

shape public opinion, with some of them spurred to do

the American position and supporting it in the

so by Baruch. In this sense, although the attitudes of

face of the attacks made by Vishinsky, that is

the public constrained Baruch’s behavior, he also

already under way. No sooner had I heard …

utilized his influence to sway public sentiments.

than I began to work with various elements of

When he presented his plan at the first meeting

the press and radio so that the American

of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission on

position would be strongly supported by

June 14, 1946, Baruch claimed that global public

American public opinion. That effort is already

opinion provided him with a mandate. Before an

bearing fruit. Editorials of the type that the

international audience, he declared, “In this crisis, we

Herald Tribune printed yesterday, Tuesday,

represent not only our governments but … the peoples

and reprinted in Paris, Wednesday, are being

of the world. We must remember that the peoples do

published throughout America. So are

not belong to the governments but that the

supporting commentaries on the air. The

governments belong to the peoples. We must answer

counter-propaganda is well under way.xiii

their demands; we must answer the world’s longing for
peace and security.” He went on: “Public opinion

Token discussion of the possibility of international

supports a world movement toward security. If I read

control of atomic energy was ongoing at the time,

the signs alright, the peoples want a program not

despite the fact that the Baruch Plan’s failure to pass

composed merely of pious thoughts but of enforceable

the Security Council two years prior had made the

sanctions – an international law with teeth in it.”xiv

issue effectively moot. Nonetheless, the telegram

Baruch’s words suggest that public opinion played a

informs analysis of the link between public opinion

major role in the development of the plan, as he

and the Baruch Plan by indicating that Baruch was

specifically cited the opinion of “the peoples” in his

both able and willing to deploy his connections in the

justification for the inclusion of enforcement

media to produce favorable editorials. While the

provisions, echoing the message of his June 6 memo to

document concerned counter-propaganda that Baruch

Truman.

YURJ | yurj.yale.edu
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New Journal and Guide cited a NORC poll showing

role in the negotiation process, or the lack thereof.

that 75% of respondents favored Baruch’s inspection

Early on, even before presenting his plan, Baruch

regime when it was described to them (though they

realized the possible adverse impact that the public’s

were not asked about the plan by name given that it

understanding of official government policy might

was not yet widely known).xvi Another NORC poll,

have had on the strength of the United States’

conducted in September 1946, showed that 65% of

negotiating position. In a March 1946 letter to

those polled believed the best course of action to

President Truman, Baruch deplored the public release

preserve peace would be to strengthen the United

of the Acheson-Lilienthal Report, as he felt that the

Nations so it could enforce a ban on atomic bombs.xvii

close association of the committee with the State

In a November 1946 poll by AIPO, the majority of

Department gave the impression that the report was

respondents opposed unilateral disarmament.

official government policy. He wrote, “This situation

Specifically, 65% disagreed with the suggestion that

has been brought very forcibly to my attention by the

“the United States should stop making atom bombs

press announcements of the [Acheson-Lilienthal

and destroy those already made to prove our good

Report]. I do not underestimate the effect of this

intentions in asking for international control of atomic

publication in the United States or in the world at

bombs.”xviii This finding was affirmed by a Gallup poll

large. … This brings the report pretty close to the

published on December 26, 1946, just four days before

category of the United States Government policy.”

the Security Council voted down the Baruch Plan. The

Baruch’s concerns about this issue were serious

Atlanta Constitution reported the results of that poll,

enough that he asked Truman to “postpone any action

which found that 72% of Americans surveyed said the

on confirmation of my appointment until I have had a

United States should not cease production of atomic

little more time to think things over.”xv Baruch seemed

bombs and destroy its existing arsenal. The article

determined to ensure that he, not Acheson, Lilienthal,

commented, “Public sentiment continues to oppose a

or another member of their committee, would be the

Russian suggestion that, to show our good faith in

one shaping policy and thus public opinion regarding

international disarmament, we stop making atom

the government’s position.

bombs and destroy those already on hand.”xix

Opinion polls conducted shortly after Baruch

Polls like these indicated that in the weeks and

introduced his proposal reflected broad support among

months before the final vote on the Baruch Plan, the

Americans for the elements of the plan. A newspaper

American public seemed to support inspections, which

article from July 1946 reported the results of a poll

were part of the plan, and opposed unilateral

about the inspection system proposed by Baruch; the

disarmament, which was part of the Soviet Union’s
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counter-proposal, the Gromyko Plan. That proposal,

as much in a letter to Lewis Douglas, the American

named for Soviet Ambassador to the United Nations

Ambassador to the United Kingdom. Osborn wrote,

Andrei Gromyko, was in many ways the antithesis of

“Any serious weakening of the proposals would not

the Baruch Plan. It called for immediate American

only be unacceptable to the United States Government,

atomic disarmament and eventual international atomic

but also to American public opinion. … It seems clear

control, with no international role in verification, no

that any attempt to ‘mediate’ between the United

sanctions or other enforcement, and preservation of

States and the Soviet now … would be resented by the

Security Council members’ ability to veto resolutions

American public as an attempt at appeasement.”xxiii

on atomic matters.xx

This specific mention of appeasement harkened back

Although the aforementioned polls may give

to Baruch’s speech to the United Jewish Appeal and

the impression of widespread American support for the

revealed a dynamic in which Baruch both attempted to

Baruch Plan, they should not necessarily be construed

mobilize the public against appeasement at one point,

as evidence of such a consensus. In fact, public

and then later cited this same aversion to appeasement

awareness of the Baruch Plan shortly after it was

felt by the public to justify his decision not to negotiate

introduced was quite low. In a June 1946 NORC poll,

with the Soviets. Clearly, Baruch and his team were

only 29% said that they had heard or read about it.xxi

keenly aware of public opinion and understood that if

Awareness of the plan had increased by early 1947, but

they weakened inspection and enforcement provisions,

the majority of the public remained unfamiliar with it;

or pushed up the United States’ hypothetical atomic

a February 1947 NORC poll found that 45% of

disarmament date, they would risk alienating the

respondents had heard or read about the plan.xxii

American people. Like Baruch’s aforementioned

While the available evidence makes it difficult

memo to Truman, Osborn’s letter was classified,

to definitively determine the influence (relative to

increasing its reliability as a source given the relatively

other factors) that public opinion had on the

high likelihood that it accurately reflected the thinking

breakdown of negotiations or to prove a causal link,

of Baruch and his team.

evidently the sentiments of the public constituted a
significant factor. Baruch’s awareness of polls showing
that the American populace favored the elements of his
plan over those of the Gromyko Plan likely
strengthened his confidence and may have encouraged
him to remain obstinate in his rejection of the latter
proposal. Baruch’s deputy Frederick Osborn indicated
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Truman himself stated that Baruch placed

newspaper accounts were even more laudatory than

much importance on public opinion. In his 1956

this in their praise. He added, “Nor was Baruch

memoir Years of Trial and Hope, Truman wrote that

unmindful of or indifferent to the paean of enthusiasm

Baruch “had, of course, full knowledge of the

with which his plan was greeted. A survey of

President’s responsibility for national policy. His

newspaper editorials by his staff claimed to show that

concern, in my opinion, was really whether he would

98.5 percent of press opinion was favorable to the

receive public recognition. He had always seen to it

report.”xxv Baruch’s instruction to his staff to sample

that his suggestions and recommendations, not always

media coverage (despite possibly having influenced

requested by the President, would be given

some of those editorial positions himself) indicates the

publicity.”xxiv Given that
Truman had frequent contact
and candid conversations with
Baruch, the book provides
important insights into
Baruch’s purpose and
motivations. Baruch’s
preoccupation with public
opinion thus may have led him
to prefer gaining the favor of
the populace over seriously
negotiating and obtaining an

“In his 1956 memoir Years
of Trial and Hope, Truman
wrote that Baruch ‘had, of
course, full knowledge of
the President’s
responsibility for national
policy. His concern, in my
opinion, was really whether
he would receive public
recognition.’”

international pact.
Gregg Herken’s research reinforces the notion

value he placed on the
sentiments of the populace.
Herken’s analysis supports the
idea that popular opinion was
indirectly influential in the
negotiations process, as positive
reception of the proposal likely
contributed to Baruch’s
increasingly headstrong attitude
and refusal to compromise on
the terms of his plan.
Ultimately, the Soviet

Union blocked the proposal in the United Nations
Security Council. Two years later, in his book

that public support for Baruch’s proposal bolstered his

Uncommon Sense, Robert Oppenheimer reflected on

self-assurance. In The Winning Weapon, Herken wrote

the failure of the plan. Oppenheimer, who during the

that Baruch gained a “public vote of confidence” from

war had been director of the Manhattan Project, which

the reception his plan received. Herken explained that

produced the atomic bomb, was at this time chairman

American reaction to the proposal was

of the General Advisory Committee of the newly-

“overwhelmingly favorable,” citing a New York Times

created United States Atomic Energy Commission.

article that described it as “’thoughtful, imaginative,

Expressing concern about the catastrophic potential of

and courageous.’” Herken commented that most

the weapons he had helped create, Oppenheimer stated
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that it was impossible to know “in what context, and in

opinion, in which the former actively shapes the latter,

what manner of the world, we may return again to the

while the latter constrains the behavior of the former. It

great issues touched on by the international control of

also serves as an example of the role that domestic

atomic energy.” Yet he remained hopeful: “Even in the

affairs play in the two-level game of international arms

history of recent failure … we may discern the

control; public opinion has the potential to influence

essential harmony, in a world where science has

arms control proposals, negotiations, and outcomes.

extended and deepened our understanding of the
common sources of power for evil and power for good,
of restraining the one and of fostering the other. This is
seed we take with us, travelling to a land we cannot
see, to plant in new soil.”xxvi But despite
Oppenheimer’s eloquent optimism, the failure of the
Baruch Plan spelled the end of any serious attempts at
international control of atomic energy in the post-war
period and paved the way for the atomic arms race of
the Cold War.
Declassified government documents, paired
with contemporary polling data and media
publications, demonstrate that public opinion played a
significant role in the development, negotiation, and
eventual failure of the Baruch Plan. Its author devised
its contents in part based on his perception of public
opinion. The sentiments of the public also affected
negotiations by helping solidify Baruch’s refusal to
compromise with the Soviet Union, thereby
contributing to the ultimate fate of the plan. This case
is noteworthy due to the fact the destructive capability
of atomic weapons raised the stakes of the Baruch talks
to a level unseen in any prior arms control negotiations
in history. Additionally, this case sheds light on the
complex relationship between elites and public
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